ID:189129
1/28/2009 8:29
Embassy Islamabad
SECRET
ISLAMABAD 000177
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, MARR, PK
SUBJECT: THE WAY FORWARD FOR PAKISTAN’S F-16 PROGRAM
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (C) Summary: Embassy requests that a small interagency team of decision makers visit Islamabad to chart a financial and technical way forward on the F-16 program. Ambassador confirmed January 28 with Finance Minister Tareen that the GOP would make the pending overdue payment on the purchase of new aircraft “soon,” but he asked for extra time to make the next two payments. The bottom line is that Pakistan cannot afford the $2 billion required to complete this F-16 program. At the same time, nothing is more important to good military-military (and overall U.S.-Pakistani) relations than avoiding a blow-up over the F-16 case.
2. (C) What is broadly referred to as the “”F-16 case”" is really three individual cases: (1) a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program purchase of 18 new aircraft, to be paid for entirely with Pakistani funds; (2) Renovation (Mid-Life Upgrade) on 35 of Pakistan’s fleet of 46 older F-16s, which include aircraft acquired through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, to be paid partially with FMF funding; and,
(3) a $641 million munitions case, to be purchased using Pakistani national funds. The Pakistanis also will have to pay $80 million to install the upgrade kits in Turkey and approximately $25 million to build and defend a separate F-16 base because of USG concerns about potential technology transfer to China.
3. (C) Contrary to the assumptions of many in Congress, the U.S. originally was paying less than ten percent in FMF to support the MLU program only; the rest of this program was being paid out of Pakistani national funds. As the Pakistani economy weakened, we have received increasing Pakistani requests for U.S. financial support, but we do not now have enough FMF to meet these requests. Debate is underway in Washington about how to restructure the program, but we have not formally consulted with the Pakistanis. Nor have we agreed on an inter-agency position on options, some of which will affect USG forces and other allies because of blended production lines.
4. (C) If the U.S. should decide to pay for the new F-16s or increase U.S.-funded FMF support for the upgraded aircraft, we can call the tune. Embassy cannot see how we can make such decisions absent a reprogramming or virtually guaranteed congressional support on out-year funds. If we expect the Pakistanis to pay, we need to sit down with them and go over the costs and implications of upgrading their old planes, buying new ones, or some combination of both. We also need USG decisions on pending technology transfer issues. End summary.
Background
5. (C) … [T]he Pakistan military’s doctrine and tactics primarily have been designed for a territorial war with India. To counteract India’s overwhelming superiority, Pakistan developed both its aviation and strategic/nuclear programs. Initially, the F-16 program was viewed only in the Indian context… The Pakistani F-16 program, however, will be no match for India’s proposed purchase of F-18 or equivalent aircraft.
6. (C) … F-16s are not the ideal tool for counter-insurgency operations, but they are all the Pakistanis have or are likely to acquire near term to conduct air operations. Their current F-16 capability is limited, however, and does not allow for night combat, precision bombing, or coordinated Close Air Support. The U.S. is responding to Pakistan Air Force (PAF) requests for increased Close Air Support training and is working to increase intelligence sharing to help Pakistan better target militants in the border areas. When complete, the ongoing F-16 program would provide Pakistan with night operations and improved targeting capability.
7. (C) … After 9/11, the U.S. dropped sanctions and renewed the bilateral relationship; the U.S. agreed in 2006 to a $3.5 billion arms transfer package that included a revival of the F-16 program. At the time, Pakistan was enjoying seven percent economic growth under a military government where defense acquisitions did not face public scrutiny. Today, Pakistan has a civilian government that in 2008 was forced to sign a $6.7 billion IMF Standby Agreement to stave off economic collapse.
8. (C) Walking away from this symbol of renewed post-9/11 cooperation would cause enormous political consequences. It also would make it more difficult for the government to continue cooperation on counter-insurgency operations along the Pak-Afghan border. In the past six months, we have made tremendous progress on improving U.S./ISAF-Pakistan military coordination and cooperation. These advances are helping to reduce U.S. casualties in Afghanistan and will become more important if we increase troop levels in Afghanistan. …
10. (S) Still pending is approval/implementation on three technology transfer issues. …
– Base Restrictions. Both the new and MLU F-16s are subject to Pakistan’s compliance with security restrictions that demand a separate base and 24/7 U.S. security coverage at a cost of more than $25 million. A National Defense Policy Committee (NDPC) site survey, conducted in 2006, rejected Mushaf Air base, where Pakistan’s F-16s, French Mirages, Russian MIG 21s and French Alouette Search and Rescue helicopters are currently housed, as unacceptable because of the prohibition co-mingling F-16 operations with other aircraft. There have been other USG concerns about illegal technology transfer relating to Pakistan’s co-production program with the JF-17 Chinese fighter aircraft. While finding the Shahbaz Air Base a suitable location, the NDPC noted that none of the physical security requirements were in place at the time of the inspection. Despite PAF promises that security upgrades will be in place by 2009, Post does not believe that Shahbaz will be ready in time for the proposed 2010 delivery of new F-16s.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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13. (C) Given the broad range of options being discussed in Washington, post does not yet have a final recommendation on the way forward. Absent a large influx of new FMF dollars to restructure the program, however, we believe the MLU aircraft will provide Pakistan with COIN capability in the most economical way. The new aircraft are scheduled to be delivered sooner (2010), but little has been done to prepare the Shahbaz Air Base to receive them, so we doubt the new planes can be delivered on schedule. We would propose that Pakistan be placed further back in the production line for new aircraft if possible, thus allowing the line to continue to meet USG and other allies’ needs.
PATTERSON
