Like I said before, I don't have any original sources and neither do you. The FoIA release you quoted above doesn't provide any conclusive evidence to back up your assertions. As a matter of fact it nullifies some of your original claims.
I'll address the parts you highlighted in your post:
The pilot inputs Initialization (INIT) data into the *** from the *** which has been configured with mission planning data.
Umm... so? Initialization data can mean a lot of things. Some actual pilot may answer this better.
PS cryptovariable (keys) data
That is just fancy talk for allowing access to pilot XYZ to fire up the plane and fly off. Any responsible air force would not want their fighter jets to be stolen by a group of marauding mercenaries who also happen to know how to fly a plane. Think of it as a very advanced password protection with cryptographic keys that change every 24 hours so that only the authorized pilot can fly the plane.
The *** page also provides status of the cryptovariable keys via the following messages:
*** - Indicates current number of mission duration days with keys.
*** - Insufficient keys for current mission duration.
*** - Daily key is in use but is not verified; accuracy unknown.
*** - Daily key invalid/GPS data not being used.
*** - Authorized user/daily key valid.
*** - Keys expire at 2400 hours Greenwich mean time."
Again, this reflects the multi-layered security of the jet itself and the myriad weapons systems that it boasts. Nowhere does it hint that the "authorized keys" must be acquired on a daily basis from some central database. Matter of fact, the very mention of "cryptovariable keys" means that higher command of the operating country, let's say PAF, has access to the encryption key and the regular pilots, technicians, etc don't get to enjoy the privilege. The ramifications of such a strategy are pretty obvious.
All in all, I respect your opinion but I can't bring myself to agree to it, unfortunately.
Best wishes.
